Finality and Evolution

Finality and Evolution

Although our main focus in this thesis is on the thought of St. Thomas himself in its historical context, the scientific theory of evolution in our own day appears, at least, to pose so serious a challenge to the Thomistic doctrine of intelligence as the ground of all natural forms that it seems to us appropriate to consider briefly here whether the two positions are compatible and if so what adaptations would have to be made in St. Thomas' teaching to accommodate the data of evolution. The point of conflict arises in the explanation of the origin of new biological forms. According to the most widely accepted evolutionary theory new biological forms emerge throughout the history of the cosmos out of previous ones due, at least in large part, to the interplay of chance factors, the survival of the fittest, etc. Yet, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas which we have just expounded, no natural form can be set up with its intrinsic finality save through the causality of an intelligence, which alone can ground the future-oriented dynamic intentionality of any active nature. There is also no doubt that St. Thomas, following the science of his time–what else could he do?–believed as a matter of fact in the fixity of species, as did the vast majority of scientists right down till the time of Darwin. Hence he had no difficulty in assigning God as the immediate cause of the various species of living beings in the world, following the guidance of the biblical account in the book of Genesis. The opposition between the Thomistic metaphysics of final causality and the theory of evolution seems to be clear-cut.

We have no intention of denying the well-grounded character of the theory of evolution in general. It has fought its way successfully into our contemporary scientific view of the world as the most fruitful hypothesis for explaining the emergence of new biological forms throughout the billions of years of earth's history. Any metaphysical doctrine which found itself in principle opposed to such a well-grounded theory would have to be considered gravely suspect. However, it can be seriously questioned whether such a general theory of evolution requires or has provided–indeed, could provide–any convincing evidence that the process of emergence of new forms takes place totally and exclusively by the working of chance. It would seem to be enough to hold that the interplay of chance factors in the environment plays at least some significant role. Whether or not a provident God, once His existence has been established, actually guides the overall process or intervenes unobtrusively at crucial turning points would be beyond the ability of any scientific techniques or theories either to prove or disprove. What does seem clear, however, is that the constitution of every new living form need not be attributed solely to the direct and immediate intervention of a divine or other supra-cosmic intelligent cause. The fixity of species and the immediate origin of all natural forms from God cannot be made part of a viable metaphysics today.

What adaptations does this require in St. Thomas' doctrine? Although St. Thomas himself undoubtedly did hold as a matter of fact the fixity of species and their direct origin from higher intelligence, there is nothing in his metaphysical principles as such which necessarily requires such a conclusion. Finality, as we have seen, must ultimately be grounded in some intelligent cause as its adequate sufficient reason. But there is no intrinsic reason why this ultimate causality cannot be mediated through other secondary causes, including the interplay of chance factors for the details of evolution, leaving the overall general lines of the whole process intact according to the plan of God. Thus it seems to us that a consistent Thomist could admit as a minimum hypothesis that at least the primary elements of the world-system would have to be set up in their original state by an intelligent cause, which would order their dynamic potentialities and properties toward each other in mutual correlation so that there could be a world at all. Otherwise no interactions could occur at all since there would be no determinate properties; every element would remain in total isolation and nothing further could happen. This basic constitution of the original elements would thereby set up the range of potentialities of these elements to enter into combinations with others, and these combinations in turn to enter into more complex unities, and so forth, thus opening up a vast spectrum of possible future developments, given the appropriate circumstances. The actual detailed working out in space and time of some segment of this range of potentialities could be left in whole or in part to the interplay of chance factors within the context of this basic matrix of intrinsically finalized original elements. This would be a rational way of planning the development of the universe, incorporating into the plan chance factors working according to statistical law, instead of rigidly deterministic laws pre-planning everything in detail. Thus St. Thomas' demand for intelligence at the root of all finality would be preserved intact, but the causality of intelligence would be less direct and immediate, more mediated through non-rational causes, than he himself held. Exactly how much in this whole process, however, would be left to secondary and non-rational causes and how much directly guided and planned by God would be a mystery beyond the penetration of either science or metaphysics.

References

¹ De principiis naturae, c. 31: Efficiens vero dicitur causa respectu finis, cum finis non sit in actu nisi per operationem agentis; sed finis dicitur causa efficientis cum efficiency non operetur nisi per intentionem finis. Et ideo non est causa causalitatis finis, id est, non facit finem esse causam finalem.

² Paul Alexandre Janet, Final Causes (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clarke, 1883), p. 33: is therefore a sort of cause, but a cause which acts in some fashion before existing; it is an effect which foreseen or predetermined by the efficient cause, has obliged it to take one direction rather than another, it is an end. Paul Janet continues, p. 32: “From all this it follows that the sought for criterion of the final cause is the agreement of the present with the future, the determination of the one by the other.”

³ Summa theologica I, q. 28, a. 2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Schmitz, Disput uber das Teleologische Denken, p. 171.

⁶ de Régnon, La métaphysique des causes d'après Saint Thomas et Albert Le Grand as quoted by de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being, p. 272: “Hence the intention and the action are united in one and the same term. Thus the end is the bond between the intentional and the efficient order and consequently belongs to both orders. In the efficient order the end is the goal of the operation, finis in re, but antecedently it was in the intentional order …the purpose of the operation, finis in intentione.”

⁷ Summa theologica, I, q. 44, a. 7; q. 105, a. 5; a_lso, I, q. 2, 5; Summa contra gentiles, III, cc. 2, 3, 16, 18, 22, 24-25, 112.

⁸ Quaest. disp. de Veritate, q. 22, a. 4.

⁹ Summa theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 12, a. 5: “prout scilicet ordinat motum alicuius, vel sui vel alterius in finem, quod est rationis tantum.” Cf. also Ia-IIae, q. 12, a. 2; Quaest disp. de Ver., q. 24, a. 2.

Plato on Democracy

Finality as Participation in an Idea

Finality as Participation in an Idea

We have established up to this point that all finality in this universe must ultimately be reducible to some intelligence as its source since only intelligence is capable of being the originating source of conscious and self-determined finality. The basic reason for this conclusion was the necessary immateriality of the self-determined agent acting for an end. The necessary transcendence of time, the intelligibility of the possible as such and the intelligibility of relations (now-future, actual-possible, means-end, etc.) are within the capacity of an intrinsically immaterial intelligent agent alone.

We recall that the end must be present in an immaterial fashion in the agent since it is not yet physically existing according to its own nature. This immaterial existence is a form of ideal existence: the end is present in the intelligent agent as an idea. This very presence of the end in an ideal fashion St. Thomas calls intentional presence. Thus intentionality spells an order of immateriality and intelligibility.

Let us consider the fact that an external thing understood by us does not exist in our intellect according to its own nature; rather, it is necessary that its species be in our intellect, and through this species the intellect comes to be in act. Once in act through this species as through its own form, the intellect knows the thing itself. This is not to be understood in the sense that the act of understanding itself is an action proceeding to the thing understood as heating proceeds to the heated thing. Understanding remains in the one understanding because the above mentioned species which is a principle of intellectual operation as a form, is the likeness of the thing understood.

We must further consider that the intellect having been informed by the species of the thing, by an act of understanding forms within itself a certain intention of the thing understood, that is to say, its notion which the definition signifies. This is a necessary point because the intellect understands a present and an absent thing indifferently. In this the imagination agrees with the intellect. But the intellect has the characteristic in addition, namely, that it understands a thing as separated from material conditions, without which a thing does not exist in reality. But this could not take place unless the intellect formed the above-mentioned intention for itself. Now since this understood intention is, as it were, a terminus of intelligible operation, it is distinct from the intelligible species that actualizes the intellect and that we must consider the principle of intellectual operation, though both are a likeness of the thing understood. For, by the fact that the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding, is the likeness of the external thing it follows that the intellect forms an intention like that thing since as a thing is, such are its works. And because the understood intention is like something, it follows that the intellect, by forming such an intention, knows that thing.⁶⁵

Finality presupposes necessarily the intentional order without which there simply would not be any finality at all, since we already established that the order of the ideal or intentional is an indispensable condition for self -determined origination of finality by some intelligence, which must be the cause of all finality. Now since this finality belongs to all beings (every agent acts for an end), it follows, that through finality all being somehow participates in the intentional and thus in the ideal. Finality pervades all reality since every agent acts for an end. We also recall that finality admits gradation in different beings; it is realized in different degrees. In the most proper sense it is the domain of intelligence which is its self-determined and conscious originating source. The lower form of finality, the infra-intelligent cognitive finality of the animal and the finality of the non-cognitive order of being must also be derived from the same originating source: the intentionality of an intelligent agent of some sort, and, as determined finally, participate somehow in the intentional order although in an analogical and derivative mode, i.e., conscious or unconscious although not self-determined. There exists an obvious gradation here and thus participation in the order of the intentional.

This is quite clear to one who observes the nature of things. He will find, in fact, if he makes a careful consideration, that the diversity of things is accomplished by means of gradations. Indeed he will find plants above inanimate bodies and above plants irrational animals and above them intellectual substances. And among individuals he will find a diversity based on the fact that some are more perfect than others, inasmuch as the highest members of a lower genus seem quite close to the next higher genus.⁶⁶

This gradation which is determined by the diversity of forms is based on a different relationship of those forms to matter in different beings. And since forms determine the mode of action the operations of each being depend on this relationship. St. Thomas points this out very often, e.g.

From the diversity of forms there also follows a diverse relationship of matter to things. In fact, since forms differ because some are more perfect than others, there are some of them so perfect that they are self-subsistent and self-complete, requiring no substructure of matter. But other forms cannot perfectly subsist by themselves, and do require matter as a foundation. So that what does subsist is not simply form, nor yet merely matter, but a thing composed of both.⁶⁷

And somewhat later he continues: “Moreover as a result of the diversified relationship to matter, there follows a diversity of agents and patients…those things whose forms are more perfect and less material must act on those that are more material and whose forms are more imperfect.”⁶⁸ “The immateriality of a thing is the reason why it can know, and the mode of its non-materiality sets the measure of its knowledge. Plants are unable to know because they are so earthbound, but sense is cognitive because it receives non-material impressions, while the mind is freer still and less involved in matter.”⁶⁹

Immaterial, intelligible, intentional mean ideal. To the degree something participates in the intentional order it “takes part,” “has a part,” in an idea. Thus an idea is present to all beings since all beings have some part in it, but in an analogical derivative way when we talk of sense-cognition and non-cognitive beings. Thus inanimate and non-cognitive beings are the “lowest” in that respect. This presence of the idea in non-cognitive beings we may call an unconscious, inanimate, incarnate mode of the idea's presence. Then in the realm of life would come theplants and animals. Here the idea is more perfectly present in the plant (life) and still more perfectly in sense-awareness and activity of the animal, where it is consciously present although in a sense-mode intrinsically dependent on conditions of materiality in an essentially instinctual, not self-determined fashion. Sense-powers participate in the idea in a deficient way since, as has been shown, sense-powers are not a sufficient ground for self-determined and conscious finality. Thus the immateriality of the animal soul is, as intrinsically dependent on matter, sufficient neither for the comprehension of intelligibles nor for transcending time as such, nor for establishing ends for itself since it is incapable of intellectually grasping relations. Nevertheless there is a higher participation in intentionality here.

With the self-determined finality of an intelligence the idea is consciously and properly in an intrinsically immaterial mode present to the mind, whose product it is, as shown in Chapter IV of this work. All other modes the idea takes, are deficient, improper, analogical modes of its presence. Because of that they are derived from intelligence since whatever perfection indicates a gradation, a participation, does not derive from itself. The being which possesses such perfection has it as taking part in it, as a partaking, and consequently there must be some other which possesses it on its own, which is the source of that perfection and consequently its origin. (St. Thomas says in Summa theologica, Ia, q. 14, 2: “The intelligible form is the divine mind itself, understanding itself by and through itself.”)

Finality, as participation in the order of the ideal or the intentional, indicates that all reality is pervaded according to degrees by the presence of idea, which in turn points to the presence of some mind. St. Thomas explains:

It must be then, that the species of things caused and intended by the intellectual agent exist beforehand in his intellect, as the forms of artifacts exist in the intellect of the artist and are projected from there into their products. So, all the forms that are in the lower substances and all their motions are derived from the intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Consequently, Boethius says in his book The Trinity that “forms which are in matter have come from forms which are without matter. And on this point Plato’s statement is verified that forms separated from matter are the principles of forms that are in it. Although Plato claimed that they subsist in themselves and immediately cause the sensible things, we assert that they exist in the intellect and cause lower form.”⁷⁰

“So, then, it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of knowledge are moved and perform actions for an end. They tend to that end as things directed to it by an intellectual substance.”⁷¹

All finality presupposes the intentional presence of an idea and thus since all reality is finally determined it participates in idea. The modes of this participation in idea are (1) most proper and perfect: self-determined and conscious mode of participation (originating finality); (2) derivative analogous mode which again may be subdivided into conscious but not self-determined (animals endowed with sense-powers) and neither conscious nor self-determined participation in idea in the non-cognitive beings. Finality proves that the idea can be present in a deficient incarnate mode of presence in the lower forms of intentionality. It is a graded participated mode of existence of the idea outside the mind. As O'Mahoney so well expresses it:

The world is saturated with idea, with spirit, with law: it is idea crystallized, thought materialized, law realized. The Mind reflects back this inherent intelligibility of things. It answers to the dynamism of reality. It is the term of the evolution of things…Matter, that is, “materia prima,” is as such purely indeterminate, the merest limit and negation. But the moment it has idea towards which it tends insofar as that is possible, it has the germ of activity and prophetically the guarantee of its intelligibility… Mind is the truth of nature.⁷²

The Destruction of Thought - Crisis Magazine

The Destruction of Thought - Crisis Magazine

Final Cause in St. Thomas Aquinas

Final Cause in St. Thomas Aquinas

Although St. Thomas was primarily a Christian theologian, we are interested here in his philosophical vision. It must be pointed out that for St. Thomas there exists a fundamental harmony between human thought (reason) and faith. Both come from the same source, God. Philosophy has its own authority and autonomy. In working out his philosophical vision St. Thomas repeated time and again that the human intellect is capable of attaining at truth on its own, and that this is possible even without the aid of grace. Here he pointed out the Greek Thinkers as an example.

For St. Thomas philosophy is necessary since it is the common ground on which all people willing to seek the truth can meet, even if they differ insofar as their religious faith in revealed scriptures is concerned.¹

The primary concern of St. Thomas was always one: to show the truth. Here is the root of his extraordinary universalism, when it comes to collecting true insights from any thinker whatsoever whether among his predecessors or contemporaries. Although Aristotle remained for Thomas always 'the Philosopher,' he had to modify Aristotelian views considerably, and elements of Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Arabic and Judaic thought are not lacking within his synthesis, which nevertheless remained thoroughly original.²

Thus, from Aristotle, Aquinas took the basic position of the theory of knowledge and on it he built his moderate realism, within which the ultimate ground of truth is always in realistic experience. The Stagirite provided also the theory of the causal connection of beings. When it comes to the theory of finality in the universe, Aquinas utilized the analysis of change done so well by Aristotle and his notion of immanent finality of beings composed of matter and form. In this regard, however, he had to modify Aristotle on many essential points, especially when it comes to consider the relationship between God and the universe. For Thomas, God is the Creator–the Efficient Cause of all reality that is not God. He is also the Ultimate Final Cause of the universe. It is impossible to know the First Cause without at the same time knowing the First End.³ For St. Thomas all beings are most intimately dependent in their whole reality on God's causality: in their existence, in their operations, in their structure and in their finality. But, most importantly, finality in Thomas' thought is ultimately grounded in the Divine Intelligence operative in the universe as well as directing all towards God, as the Ultimate Final End. Here Thomas went-as we shall show later in what follows–far beyond Aristotle. The relationship between the God of Thomas Aquinas and the universe is far richer and more intimate than any ancient thinker could imagine. The essence of this relationship can be briefly, in a condensed version, expressed as: Creator-creature. The basic condition of every finite is defined by creatureliness. God's position is best expressed in this respect by the two letters of the Greek alphabet: alpha and omega.

There is in Thomas a considerable amount of Plato's thought. Two elements especially are of Platonic origin: the idea of participation, and the idea of forms as models of all creatures. Both positions are deeply transformed: although the ideas are models of all creatures, they are in God's mind in Thomas' philosophy, as God sees his Essence as imitable in finite modes ad extra. They are not, as in Plato, independent, subsistent entities on their own. As for participation, Thomas considers it on the plane of being primarily:⁴ each finite being insofar as it is a limited act of existence, and to that degree, participates in the perfection of Existence Itself in an analogical mode. The last remark is to be kept in mind always: being is intrinsically analogical for Thomas. God as an Intelligent Planner of the Whole Universe may also be of Platonic parentage (The Demiurge of Plato's Timaeus).

In many points Thomas agreed with Augustine, insofar as the doctrine about God is concerned both Aristotle and St. Augustine were the source, and moreover the Christian Neo-Platonist Pseudo-Denys, the early scholastics like St. Anselm and St. Bernard. It is hardly necessary to mention that the one who influenced St. Thomas the most insofar as the Aristotelianism of Aquinas goes, was his master Albert the Great.

Without falling into crude pantheism, St. Thomas incorporated into his synthesis the Plotinian idea of a hierarchical universe in which different layers of being are related to each other within the scheme of a ladder, from the least perfect to the highest. The section below man is pictured by Thomas primarily according to Aristotle, but the upper part, from man up, is predominantly neo-Platonic. Utilizing those principles, Thomas remained always within the limits of Christian philosophy; pantheism is completely alien to him. One of the fundamental principles pervading his whole metaphysical vision is the analogy of being.⁹ Within the emanationist system of Plotinus, in which everything proceeds with necessity – an idea not acceptable to the Christian understanding of the God/creature relationship–nevertheless all is ordered and pervaded by Intelligence. The principle of the sensible world realized according to order in space and matter “can only be absolutely fixed intellectual order, containing in an eternal form and accessible to pure intelligence the relationships and harmonies which are perceived in the sensible world.”¹⁰ In the Plotinian system, Intelligence–the first hypostasis–is the central hypostasis. It is above all an order, an intelligible world. But the ultimate ground of order is the Unity, the One. The One of Plotinus is a reality higher and anterior to the order itself: the One is the 'source' or the 'First.' The One includes all without distinction. St. Thomas could use much of Plotinus and he certainly did. There is a certain primacy of intelligence in the Plotinian system. This element is certainly very clear to Aquinas. However, more detailed discussion of this problem here, would go beyond the purpose of this work.The influence of St. Augustine is visible especially insofar as God's knowledge of this world is concerned, and Augustine's view of the world as created and ordered by seminal reasons: principles of teleological development, intrinsic to beings in which all perfections are potentially present. Those principles are designed by God and 'put' into things by the very fact of creation which is done according to the plan of God's ideas, in God's Intelligence. Those ideas are the exemplars according to which God's creative work is designed. In St. Augustine's own words: “God therefore knew all things which he made before He made them… He knew them that He might make them, not because He had made them.”⁵ In book XVIII of De Civitate Dei the bishop of Hippo says: “And His wisdom being simply multiple and uniformly multiform, can comprehend all incomprehensible things with such incomprehensible comprehension that whatsoever thing that is new and unlike to all other He should ever please to create, it could not be irregular or unforeseen by him.”⁶

In the “seminal reasons” (rationes seminales) there is a principle of intrinsic teleological development of all reality: “As in the seed there are invisibly present all the things which in course of time will grow into a tree, so the universe must be conceived…”⁷ And so, according to Augustine, “God's will diffuses itself through all things by certain perfectly ordered movements of created things, first spiritual, then corporeal, and puts all to the service of the immutable bidding of its purpose…”⁸ The Platonic ideas are now ideas of God's creative structuring of all reality according to His intelligent design. This idea is obvious in the system of Thomas Aquinas. For him, too, all action for an end is ultimately grounded in God's Intelligence. The Christian Platonism of Augustine was primarily Christian. As such it could be utilized, to an extent, by St. Thomas.

We must stress emphatically at this point that although St. Thomas used all those elements of other thinkers, and he confesses this openly (see footnote), nevertheless his synthesis is not a mere eclectic conglomeration: as we hope it will appear later in this work, Thomas hardly used any elements of other thinkers without a deep transformation and adaptation within his basic focus of reflection, always present to his mind: the focus on the plane of being as such, the existential plane, on the basis of which all principles flow together to form a thoroughly original and unified vision of the thinker from Aquino.

We presuppose this knowledge in the reader: the existential character of St. Thomas thought. At this point we mention it only, saving a more detailed elaboration of it for one of the following chapters.