Final Cause in St. Thomas Aquinas
Although St. Thomas was primarily a
Christian theologian, we are interested here in his philosophical vision. It
must be pointed out that for St. Thomas there exists a fundamental harmony
between human thought (reason) and faith. Both come from the same source, God.
Philosophy has its own authority and autonomy. In working out his philosophical
vision St. Thomas repeated time and again that the human intellect is capable
of attaining at truth on its own, and that this is possible even without the aid of grace. Here
he pointed out the Greek Thinkers as an example.
For St. Thomas philosophy is necessary
since it is the common ground on which all people willing to seek the truth can
meet, even if they differ insofar as their religious faith in revealed scriptures
is concerned.1
The primary concern of St. Thomas was
always one: to show the truth. Here is the root of his extraordinary
universalism, when it comes to collecting true insights from any thinker
whatsoever whether among his predecessors or contemporaries. Although Aristotle
remained for Thomas always 'the Philosopher,' he had to modify Aristotelian
views considerably, and elements of Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Arabic and Judaic
thought are not lacking within his synthesis, which nevertheless remained
thoroughly original.2
Thus, from Aristotle, Aquinas took the
basic position of the theory of knowledge and on it he built his moderate
realism, within which the ultimate ground of truth is always in realistic
experience. The Stagirite provided also the theory of the causal connection of
beings. When it comes to the theory of finality in the universe, Aquinas
utilized the analysis of change done so well by Aristotle and his notion of
immanent finality of beings composed of matter and form. In this regard,
however, he had to modify Aristotle on many essential points, especially when
it comes to consider the relationship between God and the universe. For Thomas,
God is the Creator–the Efficient Cause of all reality that is not God. He is
also the Ultimate Final Cause of the universe. It is impossible to know the
First Cause without at the same time knowing the First End.3 For St.
Thomas all beings are most intimately dependent in their whole reality on God's
causality: in their existence, in their operations, in their structure and in
their finality. But, most importantly, finality in Thomas' thought is
ultimately grounded in the Divine Intelligence operative in the universe as
well as directing all towards God, as the Ultimate Final End. Here Thomas
went-as we shall show later in what follows–far beyond Aristotle. The
relationship between the God of Thomas Aquinas and the universe is far richer
and more intimate than any ancient thinker could imagine. The essence of
this relationship can be briefly, in a condensed version, expressed as:
Creator-creature. The basic condition of every finite is defined by
creatureliness. God's position is best expressed in this respect by the two
letters of the Greek alphabet: alpha and omega.
There is in Thomas a considerable amount of
Plato's thought. Two elements especially are of Platonic origin: the idea of
participation, and the idea of forms as models of all creatures. Both positions
are deeply transformed: although the ideas are models of all creatures, they
are in God's mind in Thomas' philosophy, as God sees his Essence as imitable in
finite modes ad extra. They are not, as in Plato, independent, subsistent
entities on their own. As for participation, Thomas considers it on the plane
of being primarily:4 each finite being insofar as it is a limited
act of existence, and to that degree, participates in the perfection of
Existence Itself in an analogical mode. The last remark is to be kept in mind
always: being is intrinsically analogical for Thomas. God as an Intelligent
Planner of the Whole Universe may also be of Platonic parentage (The Demiurge
of Plato's Timaeus).
In many points Thomas agreed with
Augustine, insofar as the doctrine about God is concerned both Aristotle and
St. Augustine were the source, and moreover the Christian Neo-Platonist Pseudo-Denys,
the early scholastics like St. Anselm and St. Bernard. It is hardly necessary
to mention that the one who influenced St. Thomas the most insofar as the
Aristotelianism of Aquinas goes, was his master Albert the Great.
The influence of St. Augustine is visible
especially insofar as God's knowledge of this world is concerned, and
Augustine's view of the world as created and ordered by seminal reasons:
principles of teleological development, intrinsic to beings in which all
perfections are potentially present. Those principles are designed by God and
'put' into things by the very fact of creation which is done according to the
plan of God's ideas, in God's Intelligence. Those ideas are the exemplars
according to which God's creative work is designed. In St. Augustine's own
words: “God therefore knew all things which he made before He made them… He
knew them that He might make them, not because He had made them.”5
In book XVIII of De Civitate Dei the bishop of Hippo says: “And His wisdom
being simply multiple and uniformly multiform, can comprehend all
incomprehensible things with such incomprehensible comprehension that
whatsoever thing that is new and unlike to all other He should ever please to
create, it could not be irregular or unforeseen by him.”6
In the “seminal reasons” (rationes
seminales) there is a principle of intrinsic teleological development of all
reality: “As in the seed there are invisibly present all the things which in
course of time will grow into a tree, so the universe must be conceived…”7
And so, according to Augustine, “God's will diffuses itself through all things
by certain perfectly ordered movements of created things, first spiritual, then
corporeal, and puts all to the service of the immutable bidding of its purpose…”8
The Platonic ideas are now ideas of God's creative structuring of all
reality according to His intelligent design. This idea is obvious in the system
of Thomas Aquinas. For him, too, all action for an end is ultimately grounded
in God's Intelligence. The Christian Platonism of Augustine was primarily
Christian. As such it could be utilized, to an extent, by St. Thomas.
Without falling into crude pantheism, St.
Thomas incorporated into his synthesis the Plotinian idea of a hierarchical
universe in which different layers of being are related to each other within
the scheme of a ladder, from the least perfect to the highest. The section
below man is pictured by Thomas primarily according to Aristotle, but the upper
part, from man up, is predominantly neo-Platonic. Utilizing those principles,
Thomas remained always within the limits of Christian philosophy; pantheism is
completely alien to him. One of the fundamental principles pervading his whole
metaphysical vision is the analogy of being.9 Within the
emanationist system of Plotinus, in which everything proceeds with necessity – an
idea not acceptable to the Christian understanding of the God/creature
relationship–nevertheless all is ordered and pervaded by Intelligence. The
principle of the sensible world realized according to order in space and matter
“can only be absolutely fixed intellectual order, containing in an eternal form
and accessible to pure intelligence the relationships and harmonies which are
perceived in the sensible world.”10 In the Plotinian system, Intelligence–the
first hypostasis–is the central hypostasis. It is above all an order, an
intelligible world. But the ultimate ground of order is the Unity, the One. The
One of Plotinus is a reality higher and anterior to the order itself: the One
is the 'source' or the 'First.' The One includes all without distinction. St.
Thomas could use much of Plotinus and he certainly did. There is a certain
primacy of intelligence in the Plotinian system. This element is certainly very
clear to Aquinas. However, more detailed discussion of this problem here, would
go beyond the purpose of this work.
We must stress emphatically at this point
that although St. Thomas used all those elements of other thinkers, and he
confesses this openly (see footnote),
nevertheless his synthesis is not a mere eclectic conglomeration: as we hope it will appear
later in this work, Thomas hardly used any elements of other thinkers without a
deep transformation and adaptation within his basic focus of reflection, always
present to his mind: the focus on the plane of being as such, the existential
plane, on the basis of which all principles flow together to form a thoroughly
original and unified vision of the thinker from Aquino.
We presuppose this knowledge in the reader:
the existential character of St. Thomas thought. At this point we mention
it only, saving a more detailed elaboration of it for one of the following
chapters.
Building up the Principle of
Finality:
“Every Agent Acts for an End.”
St. Thomas considers this principle within the
context of mutual reciprocity of causes. The efficient cause insofar as it is
efficient at all is intelligible only as acting for an end. In other words, in
their very intelligibility, they stand or fall together. This is the gist of
the arguments that follow.
If any finite being exists, it exists as
structured intrinsically: it exists as possessing a determined nature, i.e., a
determined principle of activity conferring determination and individualizing
the act of existence, and giving it a definite direction of activity. There
simply is no physical being which could really exist and yet remain
undetermined. Such a being is inconceivable. It follows that any finite being
concretely existing in rerum natura is determined. By the same token any action
is determined, directioned, since: operari sequitur esse. But every determined
action tends to a determined end, to a determined terminus ad quem.11
To the question: what determined action?
the answer must be that since action is an emanation from a subject to which it
is transcendentally related, it receives its determination from the nature of
the subject. Nature is nothing else but the intrinsic ultimate principle of
activity.
To quote St. Thomas himself: “Now every
inclination of an agent tends toward something definite. A given action does
not stem from any power, but heating comes from heat, cooling from cold.”12
An undetermined action is no action, it is
an absurdity inconceivable and unintelligible, an impossibility. With his usual
clarity St. Thomas expresses this in the following words: “Besides, if an agent
did not incline toward some definite effect, all results would be a matter of
indifference to him. Now he who looks upon a manifold number of things with
indifference no more succeeds in doing one of them, than another. Hence from an
agent contingently indifferent to alternatives no effect follows, unless he be
determined to one effect by something. So, it would be impossible for him to
act.”13 An indifferent action is undetermined, not-directioned, and
as such, a figment of phantasy, an impossibility. There always must be a
determining element thanks to which an action is, and it is this action and not
another, tending to this terminus ad quem, a determined end. The end determines
the being-acting. It is the reason why action is simply as such. Thus any
being-that-acts manifests finality by the very fact of its real defined
activity, directed toward some definite object-actuality, without which action
would remain unintelligible and an impossibility.
Every action is intrinsically oriented
towards an end of the action. Action is a doing of an effect-end. For this end
is that towards which it tends in a determined, i.e., intrinsically directed
way. Since each action is an orderly actualization of an effect-end, the
production of a definite end is this at which the action aims. This 'aiming at'
has its ground in the intrinsic determination of each action toward a definite
terminus, i.e., a definite end. Thus every agent acts for an end.
Thus, the reason why the determination of
an action is identically an orientation toward its effect as end is that the
very nature of every action is forward-pointing – It is precisely the
production of its effect to be.l4
Thus every agent acts for an end. The
preceding argument can be broken down into the following points: a) whatever is
actual, acts; b) but every action is a determined action; c) every determined
action is intrinsically oriented towards a definite end; d) thus every agent
acts for an end.
The end becomes apparent–reveals itself–in
a being insofar as it is an acting being. Now since the analysis of a
subject-acting-insofar-as-acting–as proved above–reveals the necessity of its
determination, and the end is the definite term of any such determined action,
the end is the ground, the reason why action exists at all. Thus every agent
acts for the sake of an end. St. Thomas explains: “Efficient cause is the cause
of final cause, final cause of efficient cause …thus the efficient cause
derives its causality from the final cause.”15 Hence “omne agens
agit propter finem” is a universal principle embracing all agents and, as
noted, it includes: a) beings endowed with intellectual insight in the most
proper sense; b) beings endowed with sense knowledge; and c) beings without any
knowledge at all. Thus the principle includes all actual beings as actual. The
validity of the principle omne agens agit propter finem can be illustrated by
reducing its negation to absurdity. Since knowledge of reality consists in
knowing the ultimate causes, the one who denies the above principle implicitly
negates also all other causes. This idea is well expressed by St. Thomas in the
following words: “Moreover, the end holds first place over other types of
cause, and to it all other causes owe the fact that they are causes in act: for
the agent acts only for the sake of the end, as was pointed out.”16
Thus, removing final cause is tantamount to removing all intelligible ground of
all other causes. Without them there are no effects-facts: no reality, no
knowledge. But there is reality, there is knowledge. The rejection of the
end in rerum natura must, by the same token, be a rejection of the very notion
of the nature of things. Thus the stable principle of action, producing stable
results, grounds the intelligibility of regularly recurring action, the order
of nature on the phenomenal level.
Series of Ends: Need of an
Ultimate End
This, however, raises the problem whether
the series of ends is infinite or not. In other words, are the ends
infinitely many or is there an ultimate end?
A procedure to infinity is impossible here.
Unless there is some definite ultimate end beyond which the agent does not seek
anything else, there would be an infinite regress. Yet in every action, as
proved above, we can always find a definite end. Now, if a processus ad
infinitum is accepted, the
agent would not even begin to act, because no being is moved towards the
un-reachable and in an infinite process nothing definite can be reached, since
there is always infinity left in front, and infinity can not be 'gone through'
ever.'?17 There must, then, be a definite first or ultimate end at
the origin of every action.
It is not essential at this point to
determine whether an agent acts with knowledge of the end or not, since all
beings act either by nature or by intellect. The agent acting by intellect
predetermines himself the end to be attained, but agents by nature have the end
determined by the very structure of their being, as shown above. Either way:
every agent acts for an end.18 St. Thomas remarks at the end of
chapter II of De Veritate III: “Through this consideration the error ancient
natural philosophers is refuted; they claimed that all things come about as a
result of material necessity, for they completely excluded final cause from
things.”
St. Thomas' thinking moves predominantly on
the level of the metaphysical plane of being. This is important to remember. He
very rarely appeals to phenomenological evidence by itself. The plane of being
and the metaphysically necessary structure of action as such remain always the
kernel and prime focus of his thought. As shown above, he approaches the
problem from many angles, not from one only. Nevertheless, the ultimate
metaphysical ground of his thought is the same: the metaphysical structure of a
finite as such. The principle “all agents act for an end” is transcendental,
embracing all composed beings insofar as they are such.
It is therefore established on a
metaphysical basis that every real-agent-as-such acts necessarily for an end.
All beings within the realm of the finite are finalized beings. The principle
of finality embraces all of them. Moreover–as pointed out above–the final cause
is the cause of all causes.19
The nature and essence of final cause
necessarily presents us with the question: If the final cause is a genuine
cause it is something that somehow contributes positively to the production of
the effect, to the being of the effect. How does the end accomplish this? In
other words the question concerns the formal nature of the mode of causality of
the end. The end is the last in execution and in existence (ultimum in esse as
end already attained), the last terminus ad quem. Expressed in this way it is
somewhat difficult to see how
the end can be a principle, a source? In what sense, and how is the end a
beginning of the action?
St. Thomas answers that the end is first in
intentione agentis. For without the end as somehow already present determining
the action to the particular effect rather than to another, there could be no
action at all. It could never get started.20 Intentio means the
tendency, to-be-towards, to-lean-towards, in aliud tendere:
to-be-towards-another. It signifies a dynamic relatedness to another. It
is an active-directing oneself towards-another, or to-be-directed, to be
subject to the activity of another-who-directs the being towards another.
Intentio is therefore proper to the mover, as well as to
that-which-moves-by-being moved.
The end (finis) must be present somehow to be a
genuine cause, since nothing acts unless it is present. Nothingness cannot
influence anything at all. The causality of the end (finis) is exercised
because the end is present in intention: 'in intentione agentis.' As such
it is a source, a principle influencing the tendency by directing it toward
itself. In this sense the end is a principle (principium). As such it
presupposes the existence of an agent whose activity it influences by
attracting, drawing it to itself and so directidirecting it. This influence contributes
the definiteness, directedness of the causal efficiency towards the end.
It is evident therefore that in the order
of intention the end is not only a source of influence but the first in the
order of causes. Otherwise the assertion repeatedly stressed by Thomas in
various places that the final cause is cause-of-all-causes, could not be
justified. Without the influence of the end all other modes of causality
vanish.
It follows that the end must have some mode
of presence in the order of intention. The end formally exercises its influence
by being pursued as good, as a perfection, 'ens appetibile.' This appetibility
of the good is the formal aspect under which the end influences the efficiency
of an agent.
End as Good
St. Thomas dedicates a whole chapter in the
Summa contra gentiles, book III, to arguing that every agent acts for a good.
The gist of the arguments consists in the conclusion drawn from the established
principle 'Every agent acts for an end.' Good is by definition that which
perfects another. Now the end is precisely that which perfects another. It is
that which contributes positively to the being of another. Thus good and end
are convertible and every end is a good. Thus every agent acts for a good. The
finite lacks in fullness of being: its tendency is always towards greater being, towards greater perfection: a
good-for-it.21
The good is that which all desire, towards
which all tend. The end is that towards which the tendency is directed and in
which it rests. But that in which the tendency rests is a good. It constitutes
the very meaning of good. Thus, every agent acts for a good. Again: all things „desire”
to be. This is evident from the fact that all preserve their existence and shun
destruction, annihilation, since the very fact of existing is good: it is what
is desired. Thus every action and every movement is for the sake of good.22
Beings deprived of knowledge act from
natural impulse, nevertheless it is an action for an end. Since they cannot
know the meaning of end as such, they move insofar as they are determined to
this movement by another. An intelligent being however does not determine the
end for itself, unless it do so by considering the rational character of the
good, for an object of the intellect is only motivating by virtue of the
rational meaning of the good… Therefore not even the natural agent is moved,
nor does it move for the sake of an end, except insofar as the end is good.
Therefore every agent acts for the sake of good. By the same token, whatever is
moved, is brought to the end of movement by a mover. That which is moved is in
transition from potency to act, which is a moving towards the perfect, the good…
It follows that both the mover and the moved tend to good.23
Good is that-under-the-aspect-of-which the
end attracts the action of the agent within the order of intention towards
itself. The end is a mode of being in the order of intention which influences
another (or itself, if the movement is immanent) to move actively towards
itself. To the question: how does the final cause influence the agent? the
answer is: The end-as-good exercises its influence by being-desired-as-good,24
and in this manner attracting and determining the activity of efficient cause
towards itself, as good-for-the-agent. The 'attractivity' of good is the essence
of final causality. That is why St. Thomas calls the good an appetible being
(ens appetibile).
Finality in God
One more clarification seems to be necessary at this
point. We saw that for Aristotle, the Prime Mover could not act for any other
reason than for his own self‑contemplative happiness. Thus he had to remain
completely closed within a thought that eternally thinks itself. He could not
be bothered with the imperfect moving world beneath him, nor engage in any
efficient activity on behalf of this world, since this would be below his
dignity as the Best. The Thought of the Best can be occupied only with the
Best, with Itself. As we already mentioned, this excluded the notion of God as
Creator, it cancelled out Providence and also the very essence of religion,
which consists primarily in a living relationship between Creator and His
creature. Thomas, as a Christian thinker, could not agree with such
conclusions.
This, however poses a serious problem
within the context of God’s action, which is through and through characterized
by finality: every agent acts for an end. Thus God also acts for an end. But
how? A finite being acts for an end because it is a good-for-it; it lends
perfection to it, it enriches it. But God is Infinite Fullness of Goodness, He
is Goodness Unlimited. He cannot gain, or lose, any perfection. God does not
need anything. So how is the principle 'every agent act for an end' to be
reconciled with the absolute self-sufficiency of God?
The answer to this problem lies in the
distinction between acting-for-an-end and acting-fora-final cause. Since a
cause properly speaking must always be distinct from what it influences, if God
were influenced by an end as cause He would then be dependent on something
other than Himself as cause of His action. God cannot act for a final cause
because He is the First, the Source of all existence of any finite being,
neither can He be attracted by any good “outside” since any “other” has its
very ontological ground exclusively in God, on whom it always remains
absolutely dependent in existence, in its modes of acting–in fact, in
everything–with metaphysical necessity.
Yet, in giving existence the Creator must
have a sufficient reason for acting, hence must have an end as sufficient
reason though not as cause of His acting. A sufficient reason, unlike a
cause, need not be really distinct from what it renders intelligible. Since the
principle, “Every agent acts for an end,” is transcendental, God as the First
Agent acts for-an-end, 'For-an-end' here cannot mean a real relation to another
(as it is with all finite beings), because such relation involves real
dependence on another. God, the absolutely First and Self-sufficient, can thus
have no real relation to any other being. He cannot act for another being. 'For-an-end'
in case of God's creative action and final action means only a relation of
reason, i.e., without implying any real dependence, God has a reason why He
creates all other finite beings; why He creates the universe 'ex nihilo.' Thus
God has a sufficient reason for the sake of which He acts, but He does not act
for any final cause. (He himself is the Ultimate End of all reality.)
Now the only sufficient reason for God's
creative action can be God's Infinite Goodness identical with Himself. God
loves this Infinite Goodness absolutely, but He also loves this Goodness as
communicable to others. Here we see the great difference between the
Aristotelian Prime Mover and the God
of Thomas, the Christian God. All the universe is God's work. It is the
effect of God's free creative causality, inasmuch as God sees His Goodness and
loves It as communicable to others in infinitely various modes; of finite
existences. As there is no “interest,” no “gain,” for God in this action, since
Infinite Existence cannot gain more or “acquire” more in any conceivable way,
this very same action must nevertheless be ultimately directed toward Himself.
God loves His Goodness, his very Self, but as communicable to others. This
constitutes the sufficient reason, the end for the sake of which God acts. In
this fashion God's whole action is for Himself, but also for others.
“For others” must be understood here as
meaning that the ontological ground for the existence of the universe is
creation-out-of-nothing, the sufficient reason of which is God's love for
Himself as communicable to others. The creature is established by this creative
act in complete and absolute ontological dependence on God. Thus it can be said
that the whole “gain” is on the part of the creature. Creatureliness implies
the deepest ontological dependency-bond in existence with the Creator. God's
Providence, which truly is the continuation of creation, reaches to the least
in the realm of the finite. Thomas dedicates two whole chapters in Summa contra
gentiles I, to arguing that God knows all things, even lowly things, and that
this fact not only does not detract from his dignity, but even augments it.25
The gist of the argument is based on the infinite power of the divine mind on
one hand, and on the other on the participation in existence as closer to God
or farther from Him. The Divine Mind as infinite in power is in his cognition
constitutive activity and so it embraces all finite, beings; lowliness and
dignity of things are relative notions depending on the 'closeness or
remoteness' from God in the hierarchy of finite existences. Since God's Mind is
Infinite in power, it must embrace all, and since the divine Mind cannot be
drawn down to the level of the creature, the cognition of lowly things does not
detract from God's dignity in any way. It rather augments it, insofar as such
cognition shows forth the infinite power of God's Mind.
Thus the principle “every agent acts for an
end” retains its full validity, extending analogously even to God as Supreme
Agent.
The Analogical Mode of Finalistic
Intentionality
The analogical character of intentio
(intention) should be clarified at this point in order to elucidate the problem
of how beings “tend-towards” their ends, and in what manner this intentionality
of being was understood by Thomas Aquinas.
The principle “Every agent acts for an end/
good” affirms the basic intentionality of all being, its dynamic-to-be-towards,
its in-tending, or “intention.” We use this word here only in this sense. This
remark is necessary because St. Thomas uses the word in many different senses.
Our question is how this intentionality of all active beings is verified on the
different levels of beings.
Since for Thomas Aquinas being is
predicated in an analogical way, this tendency must also be conceived in an
analogical fashion. Its meaning, therefore, varies according to the nature of
beings under consideration. In a word, 'intentio finis' is analogical in
character.
The word intentio, for St. Thomas,
signifies in its primary sense an act of will: “hoc nomen intentio nominat
actum voluntatis, praesupposita ordinatione intellectus ordinantis aliquid ad
finem.”26 Thus the will tends to its object following the
apprehension of the intellect.27
The primary meaning of intention can be
summarized in three points: a) intentio is an act; b) it is an act of the will;
and c) the intellectual knowledge is the fundament of it. This, then, is
intentio infinem in its proper sense. All other forms of it will be secondary
and derivative in relation to it.
St. Thomas, however, ascribes intentio ad
finem to all beings, including beings not endowed with-either sense
or intellectual knowledge.28
In beings not endowed with intellectual
cognition nature is the principle of intentio ad finem since it is. the
ground-principle of activity. Nature so conceived tends towards more being,
towards more good-perfection (since being and good are convertible), and thus
every good is some end: that which attracts, influences by attracting.
Intention-to-an-end, which St. Thomas calls
sometimes 'connatural appetite,' natural love,' or natural desire, is thus
strictly transcendental. Within the order of intention-to-an-end, however, a
law appears: different forms, by which the different kinds of
intentionality-to-an-end are determined, show different degrees insofar as
their materiality or immateriality is concerned. There exists a gradation here:
the more materiality, the less universal the intentionality of a being and,
conversely, the more immateriality, be more consciousness and immanence, until
we come to beings endowed with intellectual insight. Here man appears as the
highest on earth, but in respect to angels and, finally God, man is the lowest.
In animals not endowed with reason there
exists sense-knowledge through which they are capable of “practical judgment.”
Using it, they can avoid their “natural” enemies, fight for survival, etc. The
seat of this judgment is the “common sense” with which, again according to
specific degrees, animals are endowed. However, because animals do not possess
intellectual knowledge, their spontaneity remains limited within some basic
psychological determinism. In St. Thomas' words: “They act according to
discrimination but not according to a complete one.”31
In the higher animals a semblance of
freedom appears.32 The power of response extends to embrace a
broader horizon and the power of instinct reigns over them with less vigor and
absoluteness. Because, however, they are not aware of the reason for their
judgment, they do not judge in the proper meaning of the term. The judgment
they are capable of does not extend to the ideal range of all being. They do
not grasp relations as such, neither do they understand the meaning of symbols
as such. The sphere of their intentionality-to-an-end is accordingly
restricted. St. Thomas says: “All swallows build the same kind of nests, and
the industry of the bee does not go beyond the formation of honeycombs to
attempt any other form of art.”33
Non-cognitive beings, i.e., beings not
endowed with any degree of consciousness whatsoever, both living and
non-living, have their intentionality-to-an-end already predetermined by nature
on the basis of their intrinsic metaphysical structure. They possess
intentionality only in a participated, secondary manner. Their formal
determinateness is the ground of their tendency-to-an-end, which in them is
simply a built-in predetermined unconscious drive of nature towards its
appropriate end.
As already pointed out, the gradation of
intentionality-to-an-end varies according to the degree to which the being
under consideration is endowed with more immateriality, immanence, and
spirituality or, on the contrary, with more materiality, more restriction.
We can now summarize St. Thomas' position
on the universality of immanent finality in all agents, and therefore in all
beings, as follows:
a)
all beings tend-to-an-end;
b)
this tending-to-an-end in its
primary sense is found only in beings endowed with intellectual knowledge;
c)
thus, in other beings this
tendency toward-an-end is found in secondary and derivative, although still
analogical, modes, either as originating from sense knowledge or, in beings
lacking all knowledge, as originating from the completely predetermined drive
of their underlying natures as such, determined by their basic intrinsic
metaphysical structures.
We have seen that immanent finality is
necessarily connected with being itself, since in every affirmation of being as
active finality is already necessarily implied as a condition of the
intelligibility of action itself. It is important to stress that the above
conclusion is not based on phenomenal observations but on strict metaphysical
analysis and, as such, it renders finality so necessary that a denial of it can
be made only at the cost of unintelligibility, and the intelligibility of all
being is for St. Thomas one of the first principles of all thought.
References
1 Summa contra gentiles, ed.
Leonina, vol. XIII-XV (Romae, 1920-1950), I, caput II.: “Contra singulorum
autem errores …difficile est procedere.. Unde necesse est ad naturalem rationem
recurrere, cui omnes assentire coguntur.”
2 “A quibusdam enim
predecessorum nostrorum accepimus aliquas opiniones de veritate rerum, in
quibus credimus eos benedixisse, alias opiniones praetermittentes.” In
Metaphysics, lect. 2. 228.
3 Summa theologica, ed.
Leonina, vol. IV-XII (Romae, 1906 I q.103,art. 2c.: “Cum finis respondeat
principio, non potest fieri, ut principio cognito, quis sit rerum finis
ignoretur.”
4 Pourtant
l'originalité du thomisme se montrerait peut-être par la netteté avec laquelle
le système maintient, de son point de départ, la priorité de la notion d'être.
Forest, La structure métaphysique du concret selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin.
5 St. Augustine, Ad Orosium,
VIII, 9.
6 St.
Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XVIII.
7 St. Augustine, De Gen. ad
Litt., V, XIII, 45.
8 St. Augustine, De
Trinitate, III, IV, 9.
9 Quaest. disp. de Potentia,
q. 7, a. 7: Diversa habitudo ad esse impedit univocam predicationem entis.
10 Emile Brehier, The
Philosophy of Plotinus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 45.”
11 Tout
être est détermine dans la nature; il l'est donc également dans son activité,
dont la nature est le principe substantiel. Si l'action est déterminée, l'effet
le sera lui aussi. Ce qui veut dire, que l'action est ordonnée a un terme
déterminé ; ou mieux, qu’elle est déterminée en elle-même a raison de son
orientation vers un terme déterminé. Ce terme est donc la raison de l'action:
il lui donne un sens, car il la spécifie en lui imprimant une direction…
l'opération dépende de la fin, l'efficience trouve sa raison, son sens, dans le
but poursuivi. Louis De Raeymaeker, Philosophie l' être (Louvain, 1947), p.
311.
12 Quaest.
Disp. De
Veritate, Q.3, a. 2; also q.3, a. 2: “…so does the likeness of a natural
resultant preexist in the natural agent; and as a consequence of this, the
action is determined to a definite result.”
13 Quaest.
Disp. De Veritate, q. 3, a.2.
14 Ibid.
15 In Metaphysics, V, lect.
II, nr. 775.
16 Quaest. Disp. de
Veritate, q. 3, a. 17, 9; also, In Anal. Post.I, lect.16 nr. 5, book II, lect.
8, nr.3In Metaphysics, V, lect. 3, nr.782; In Lib. de causis, lect. 1.. „Nam
finis intantum est causa inquantum movet efficientem ad agendum.”
17 Quaest. Disp.de Veritate,
q. 3, a. 3. „Nihil enim movetur ad id at quod mpossibile est pervenire.”
18 Quaest. disp. de
Veritate, q. 3, a. 3: “Agens per intellectum agit propter finem sicut
determinans sibi finem: agens autem per naturam licet agat propter finem, ut
probatum est, non tamen determinat sibi finem, cum non cognoscat rationem
finis, sed movetur ad finem determinatum sibi ab alio.”
19 De Princip, nat., c. 4: „…quia a causa finail omnes aliae causae recipiunt
quod sint causae. Pour rejeter cette conclusion, il faudrait déclarer que la
cause est indépendante de sa fin. Mais dans ce cas une opération efficiente
s'accomoderait de n'importe quel effet; ce qui revient à dire
qu'elle serait indéterminée ou, en d'autres termes, qu'elle ne serait pas. I1
reste donc, que la finalité, c'est-à -dire l'influence de la fin sur
l’opération, est un élément essentiel de la causalité: quidquid agit, agit
propter finem.” Louis
de Raeymaeker, The Philosophy of Being: A Synthesis of Metaphysics, trans. Rev.
E. H. Zeigelmeyer, S.J., 6th ed. (London:
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