Chance and Finality
Within the Aristotelian system Nature is
radically pervaded by Telos. It can become intelligible only if we see it as a
universe through and through teleological.
In Chapters 4 to 6 of Physics II Aristotle
discusses the problem of chance and spontaneity, complaining that: “There are
some who ascribe this heavenly sphere and all the worlds to spontaneity. They
say that the vortex arose spontaneously, i.e., the motion that separated and
arranged in its present order all that exists.”16 The first thing
Aristotle points out in this context is that chance cannot be the cause of what
happens with constancy or for the most part.17 Constancy and
determinateness cannot be caused by chance, for chance is the exact opposite to
the latter. For Aristotle a thing comes to pass by nature or as a result of
thought or by chance. The disjunction is absolute. Things which happen by
nature or as a result of thought both belong to the class of things which are
for the sake of something. 18 So chance is a name for incidental
events which, however, are secondary by-products of actions by nature or
deliberation. A per se cause by its nature is determinate, whereas incidental
causes are indeterminable and indefinite.19 The incidental occurs
and is possible only within the sphere of what happens by nature of deliberate
intent. “It is clear then that chance is an incidental cause in the sphere of
those actions for the sake of something, which involves purpose.”20
So chance is really not a cause stricto
sensu. It is rather an unintended intersection of different events which happen
by their nature or are deliberately intended. Therefore, it is “contrary to
rule,”21 and as such it is unstable and “none of the things which
result from it can be invariable or normal.” 22 Aristotle further
explains that chance occurs only as the contrary of deliberate intention; hence
it is possible only within the “moral sphere” or where deliberate intention is
present, and thus he excludes it in inanimate things, lower animals, children.
These cannot do anything by chance because of lack of deliberate intentionality
in them. However, he grants to inanimate beings and animals spontaneity.23
Spontaneity results from an action “by nature” but one producing an
unintended result under the influence of an external agent. Spontaneity
connected with deliberate intention may result in “chance.” Both chance and
spontaneity are sources of change since “in this sort of causation the number
of causes is infinite.”24 Their effects remain always incidental and
no incidental cause is prior to cause “per se.” “Hence, however true it may be
that the heavens are due to spontaneity, it will be true that intelligence and
nature will be prior causes of this All and of many things in it besides.”25
In the last statement we can clearly see
that the universe is primarily caused by “intelligence and nature” and these
two belong, as previously stated, to the class of agents which always act for
an end, i.e., for “that for the sake of which.” Finality reigns there.
The evidence for the priority of finality
is, for Aristotle, constancy and determinateness. Both are rooted in the
metaphysical structure of each being and here the form is the final cause.
Prime matter, being their potency, does not contain determination of any kind.
We mean prime matter as such, because there certainly exists a “sequence of
forms” in nature, and prime matter already informed, actualized by some form,
seems to be “disposed” rather to this form than that one. There remains
therefore the form in beings which contributes constancy, determinateness and
finality to Nature. Those few remarks are only logical sequelae of what has
been said before on the role of form within the Aristotelian notion of
finality.
We already mentioned that for Aristotle
chance is incidental, not truly even a cause per se, indeterminate and, so to
say, a secondary by-product within the sphere of what happens “by nature and
deliberation.” As such, chance can never be a source of finality in the
universe in any sense whatsoever; it is by definition its very opposite and can
be conceived only in reference to purpose and order. Direction towards ends is
for Aristotle evident when works of nature are comparable to human actions
whose purposiveness is obvious and cannot be denied. There exists a strong
parallelism and similarity between human purposive activity and the activity of
other beings in Nature. Aristotle says: “If, therefore, artificial products are
for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products. The relation of
the later to the earlier terms of the series is the same in both.”26
In another place he emphasizes again: “It
is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present 27 because we do
not observe the agent deliberating.” Deliberation is not necessarily present,
for example, in art, though art is not thereby lacking purpose.
In any ordered series of steps in an action
that tends to a completion, all earlier steps are for the sake of the last one.
“Now surely as in intelligent action so in nature; so it is in each action if
nothing interferes. Now intelligent action is for the sake of an end;
therefore, the nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g., had been a
thing made by nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by
art; and if things made by nature were made also by art they would come to be
in the same way as by nature.”28
In human works we observe the determination
of the earlier steps in action by the later and ultimately by the “completion”
the end, the purpose in an intelligent activity. The former steps become “means”
to the later steps which lead to completion in the series. “Future” dominates
the “now.” The “now” is and is determined and produced for the sake of the “not
yet” realized, but intended future achievement. The different elements of
activity are united into a coordinated series and become members of a sequence
of activities as means (moments in the whole flow of action) precisely because
they are necessary and must exist in this and not in another sequence if the
purpose is to be attained. So the very order and determinate sequence of
realization, the ordering of many into a unified series of directed activities
and the regularity with which this ordering necessarily occurs are leading to a
purpose-completion. Directionality which is achieved through and by orderly
sequence already defines the completion as future purpose. There is a
similarity between human intelligent activity and activities that are
accomplished by nature. If in human action the orderly relationship of the
later to the earlier constitutes the finality of the whole activity it is clear
that the same is done by works of nature.
This seems to be the core of the whole
argument. Now since the activity of any being flows from its nature it reveals
the purposive character of works of nature. Aristotle gives examples from the
life and activities of birds and animals. Specifically he mentions spiders,
ants; the way the swallow builds its nest, the spider the network, the ants
their anthills. Later on he mentions plants, and seeds. Ultimately, since
nature means primarily prime matter and form, the form remains the ultimate
principle of action bearing the character of “that for the sake of which.” This
action, however, is purposive, as has been shown.
Aristotle does not even suspect that the
above line of argumentation would be attacked as anthropomorphism. He simply
points to the same elements in human intelligent activity and the works of
natural beings, living and non-living outside of the human sphere. Since he
does not see any difference between the two, his reasoning is for him conclusive:
“It is absurd to suppose that purpose is not present because we do not see the
agent deliberating.” Thus he concludes firmly: “It is plain then that nature is
a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose.”29
The Prime Unmoved Mover
The problem of how in Aristotle's
philosophy the Unmoved Mover is related to the universe is very much in place
in our discussion because it throws light on the question whether Aristotle
taught finality as solely immanent in the universe, or transcendent to it, or
both?
Although the twelfth book of the
Metaphysics starts with the problem of substance 30 the whole
argument of it leads ultimately to the existence of the Unmoved Prime Mover as
the ultimate final cause without whose existence neither movement in the world
nor its unity and inherent order, nor its structure as a universe, an
interacting whole, a unified system could be explained. The existence therefore
of the Unmoved Prime Mover is a necessity conferring unity and grounding all
previous considerations of the Physics.
The form which is the principle of internal
finality in all beings composed of potency and act explains the natural,
internal, limited attainment of self-perfection, self-fulfillment within the
limits of each being. It is a moved-moving-mover constitutive of the internal
good of each thing. All considerations related to this problem leave us still
with a multi-verse rather than with a universe.31 We would not even
be capable of explaining “why this form and this thing are one.”32
To explain movement in general, Aristotle
concluded to the existence of the Prime Unmoved Mover. If in the series of
causes, i.e., of moved-movers, an infinite regress is to be avoided, there
necessarily must exist an absolutely first Prime Mover. This Prime Mover must
be Pure Act since act is ontologically prior to potency.33 Thus the
Prime Mover must be Pure Act. Since, however, motion in the world is eternal–like
the existence of the world – the Prime Mover must be an eternal Pure Act, for
eternal motion postulates an eternal Mover. Consequently the Unmoved Prime
Mover is “…that which is first in respect of complete reality.”34
The causality the Prime Unmoved Mover exercises is restricted by Aristotle to
final causality. The Unmoved Prime Mover is the highest End and contains the
highest Good in Itself, for “…the good is in the highest degree a principle.”35
The causality of the Prime Unmoved Mover is that of an end, a purpose: It acts
by attraction grounded by its Worth, Plenitude of Perfection, Highest Good. To
the possible question how an Unmoved Mover may act in such a way Aristotle
replies: “That final cause may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by
the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for
whose good an action is done, and (b) something at which an action aims; and of
these the latter exists among unchangeable entities, the former not. The final
cause then produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being
moved.”36
Chapter ten of the Metaphysics opens with
the question: how does the universe contain the good and the highest good,
whether as something separate and by itself or as the order of the parts in the
world? Aristotle answers that the good is present in the world in both ways
using the example of an army and its leader. The good of the army is in order
and in the leader, but more in the leader than in the order because the leader
does not depend on the order, but the order on him.
Since all things are ordered together, this
world is an ordered connected system. The unity of, its order is contributed to
it by the Unmoved Prime Mover acting on the world as its Ultimate Final Cause.
The immanent finality of Physics is transcended by the transcendent finality of
Metaphysics. The limited imperfect reality demands a First Cause containing the
fullness of Actuality, whose attractive action ultimately makes intelligible
all striving and all activity and without which, as the ground of
intelligibility of immanent finality, the universe would remain a total and
impervious, opaque mystery.
Although Aristotle affirms that on the Prime
Mover the Heavens and Nature depend,37 it is worthwhile to consider
briefly what is understood by the function of the Prime Mover in relation to
the world. The Prime Mover moves the heavens directly, and only indirectly,
secondarily, the subcelestial world. It is closest to the first heavens to
which it communicates the circular movement. The influence communicated by the
Prime Mover is restricted to contributing movement and nothing else.38
For Aristotle, thought is the most divine in all reality. 39 Thus
the Prime Mover is Thought, Pure Act of Thought, but since such Thought must think only the
Best, it must remain absolutely closed upon itself. Activity ad extra, or even
thinking something else than His Own Thought, would detract from the Prime
Mover's dignity, it would disturb its happiness, and it would make it dependent
on the object of thought. Aristotle gives argumarguments for this viewpoint both in the
twelfth book of Metaphysics and in the eighth book of Nicomachean Ethics.
We shall examine both places. In chapter 9
of the twelfth book of Metaphysics Aristotle considers the nature of divine
thought and he confesses that it involves “certain problems.”40 If
it thinks nothing it would be like a man who sleeps, but “what is there here of
dignity?” Then he continues: “And if it thinks, but this depends on something
else, then (since that which is its substance is not the act of thinking but
potency) it cannot be the best substance.”41 So the Prime Mover
thinks either Itself or something else, and if something else, then the same
thing always or something different. This makes no difference for Aristotle
since in the next line he asks:
Are there not some things about which it is
incredible that it should think? Evidently, then, it thinks of that which is
most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be change
for worse, and this Would be already a movement. First, then, if 'thought' is
not the act of thinking but a potency it would be reasonable to suppose that
the continuity of thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently
be something more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought of.42
Thinking of something else, then, would
make the Prime Mover inferior and dependent on another, besides implying a
potency in it. What's more, there are some things “…which it is better not to
see than to see.” 43
Thinking these things, then, would be below
the dignity and interest of the Thought Thinking Itself. Thus „it must be of
itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of
thing), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking.” 44
The Prime Mover remains completely closed
upon himself. In the same place a little further on Aristotle gives one more
reason for his conclusion: in beings that are without matter, there is no
difference between thought and the object of thought. Thus the divine thought
and its object must be one.45 The conclusion is the same, since
‘thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is
thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense.”46
It follows again, that nothing but its very own thinking can be thought
by the Prime Mover–nothing else.
In chapter 8 of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
discusses the relation between action, 'deeds,' and contemplation. Deeds are
not only secondary in this context, but even are “hindrances, at all events to
his contemplation.”47 Then, discussing the mode of living of divine
beings he continues: “…the circumstances of action would be found trivial and
unworthy of gods…Therefore the activity of God which surpasses all others… must
be contemplative.” This is the reason why the Prime Mover cannot be an
efficient cause. 48
We already know that the content of this
contemplation can only be the thought of the divinity itself. Action, deed,
efficient causality in other words, is 'unworthy' of God.
It seems obvious that the Prime Mover is,
and within the Aristotelian thought, must remain only the initiator of movement
on the first heavens. The local movement (circular) is the root of any other.
Then from the first heavens it is communicated to the rest of nature.
Let us recall again that for Aristotle the
only movement the Prime Mover contributes is to the 'first heavens' and from
there, indirectly, this movement reaches 'down' to the rest of nature. The
essence of this contribution of the Prime Mover remains in 'being desired,' as
the Best among things.
The world for Aristotle is eternal. Both
matter and forms are eternal. Insofar as existing itself is concerned, they
exist on their own and the Prime Mover remains necessary, as explained above.
The Prime Mover is not in any way the efficient first cause of this world. The
idea of a free creation, instantaneous and ex nihilo, is completely alien to
the system of the Stagirite. If Thomas wants somehow to go over this and
'christianize' Aristotle at this point, he certainly must read into
Aristotelian text far more than
Aristotle himself would suspect.
The Prime Mover, the God of Aristotle, did
not create this world, he did not 'design' this world, he does not think of
this world, and he cannot be 'bothered' with anything but his own Thought which
he 'eternally thinks.'49
If this is so, then such a God, we must say,
has very little to do with the Providence by which the God of a Christian
believer cares even for the least sparrow, to say nothing of man.
The Aristotelian God is less than the God
of the eighteenth-century Deists. At least the deistic God created this
universe, ordered it somewhat as the model of a 'perpetuum mobile' and
then left it to its own course.
Where is religion in the Aristotelian
scheme of things? Will the Prime Mover, totally enclosed upon himself, listen
to the petty voices of mortals? Obviously not. Does he care what happens to
individuals? Obviously not. He cannot be bothered.
Does this world reflect the goodness of the
Prime Mover? It is hard to see how it could.
It is difficult (not to say impossible), to
see how there can be order in this world without the divine intelligence
actively ordering it. The immanent finality of beings composed of matter and
form, the intrinsic 'entelechy' of each being is one thing; the ordering of
beings to each other into a harmonious unified system is another. The latter,
however, has not been explained by Aristotle.
Shall we conceive even an immanent
teleology of each being a matter which does not need an ultimate reference to
intelligence? This is what Aristotle seems to allow.
The reference to the Prime Mover is
insufficient and within the context of the Aristotelian philosophy creates a
serious difficulty. We said that it is hard to conceive an ordered harmony of
the universe which is not ultimately grounded in Intelligence, and that the
intrinsic entelechy does not explain it.
There cannot be any doubt that Aristotle
was the first in the history of philosophy to elaborate the metaphysical
analysis of final cause. But neither Plato nor Aristotle really solved the
problem of the relationship between the divinity and the world on one hand, nor
did they answer completely the question how finality in the world relates to
Intelligence.
For any Christian believer, and St. Thomas
was a Christian theologian, the difficulties mentioned above are crucial on
many counts: on the metaphysical level they determine the relation between the
One and the many, on the level of man's relationship to God they are central
for any genuine religion, and insofar as the basic topic of this work is
concerned, they throw a light on how St. Thomas' predecessors solved the
problem of the relationship of finality considered in itself to its ultimate
ground: intelligence.
Neither Anaxagoras', nor Plato's, nor
Aristotle's thought was complete in this respect, although very valuable
insights have been proposed.
The enormous contribution the Stagirite
certainly made should not obscure the fact that his thought shows surprising
gaps and inconsistensies.50
References
1 Metaphysics, I, 3-9:
Physic, II,3,8; Parts of Animals, I, 1.
2 Physics, II, 8.199B,
15-20.
3 Metaphysics, 1, 4.105a
15.
4 Physics, III, I, 201a.
5 Ibid., VII, 198a (3); VII,
198a (25); VIII 198b (10) ; VIII, 199b, 30; Metaphysics, I, 983a, 30.
6 Metaphysics, XII, 7,
1072b, 1, 2, 3.
7 Physics, II, 7, 198b, 39.
“The essence of that which is coming to be,” i.e., the form; for this is the
end or „that for the sake of which.”
8 Ibid. II, I, 192b, 37.
9 Ibid., 193b, 8.
10 Ibid., II, II, 197a, 28.
11 Ibid., 195a, 25.
12 Ibid., 198a, 27. (Emphasis
mine)
13 Ibid., 199a, 7 and 8.
14 Ibid., 199a, 27-34.
15 Ibid., 199b, 27-28.
16 Ibid., II, 4, 196a, 24-26.
17 Ibid., II, 5, 196b, 10:
“First then we observe that some things always
come to pass in the same way and others for the most part.”
18 Ibid., II, 5, 196b, 24.
19 Ibid., 196b, 28.
20 Ibid., 197a, 5.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 197a, 31-33.
23 Ibid., II, 6, 197b, 14.
24 Ibid., 198a, 3-5.
25 Ibid., Chap. VI (end).
26 Ibid., II, 8, 199a 18.
27 Ibid., II, 8, 199b 27.
28 Ibid., 199a, 10-15.
29 Ibid.,II,8.
30 Metaphysics, XII, 1.
1069a.
31 Ibid., 10, 1075b 24:
“Again, if besides sensible things no other exists, there will be no first principle, no order, no
becoming, no heavenly bodies, but each principle will have another principle
before it, as in the accounts of the theologians and all the natural
philosophers.”
32 Ibid., 10, 1075b 35.
33 Ibid., XII, 8, 1074a 35;
1073a 25; 1073a 35; also chap. 6, 1071b 20.
34 Ibid., XII, 5. 1071a 35;
6, 1071b 4; 7, 1072b 11.
35 Ibid., 10. 1074b 38.
36 Ibid., XII, 7. 1072b.
37 Ibid.,
XII, 7, 1072b. 7.
38 L’interprétation
de St. Thomas consiste a Dire que le ciel et la terre dépendraient de Dieu dans
leur existence même. Or c'est là un point de vue qui parait bien étranger à
l'esprit d'Aristote. Il dit que ce qui dépend du premier moteur c'est d'abord
le ciel, ensuite et secondairement la nature. C'est qu'en effet, le premier
moteur séparé se trouve plus proche du premier ciel et lui communique ainsi un
mouvement circulaire plutôt que du centre. L'action de Dieu ne serait donc pas
créatrice, mais motrice seu1ement. Aime Forest, La structure métaphysique du
concret selon Saint Thomas d’Aquin. (Paris, 1956), p. 319.
39 Metaphysics, XII, 1012b.
40 Ibid., XII, ch. 9, 1074b.
15.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., below.
43 Ibid., below.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., XII, 7. 1072b. 19.
47 Nicomachean Ethics, 8,
1178b. 5.
48 Ibid. (Emphasis mine)
49 Ibid., 8, 1178b, passim.
50
Josef Schmitz, Disput uber das Teleologische Denken (Mainz: Matthias- Grunewald
Verlag, 1960), p. 111.
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