A Historical Note On the Idea of Final Causality Plato ( P2) Finality and Intelligence

A Historical Note On the Idea of Final Causality Before Saint Thomas Aquinas

 

Plato

Plato never accepted a purposeless mechanistic explanation of the universe. A picture of reality which was developed, for example, by Democritus, for whom whatever exists is reduced to atoms and the chance encounter in void, was radically against the whole spirit and content of Plato's philosophy. Such a mechanical, materialistic explanation was–for Plato–built on a perverted principle of the priority of matter over mind. This reductionist principle was contrary to logical thinking and experience. It was contrary to logical thinking because it explained the “higher” by the “lower” and, as such, it led to skepticism in philosophy. It perverted ethical values, and it was the root of disorder and evil in all departments of human life and experience.⁸ As a matter of fact, it was no explanation at all. Let us recall the severe criticism given by Socrates in the Phaedo⁹ against the mechanistic elements of Anaxagorian philosophy. Socrates accuses Anaxagoras of not having seen the difference between conditions and causes, and declares that the only true cause of his presence in the prison cell is not the structure of his body or the physical force which holds him there, but his own conviction that he is right in staying there. This decision and his vision of the right is the cause of his staying in prison, knowing that his days are numbered. Socrates implies here that to explain human behavior by sheer mechanics of the bodily elements is to give no explanation at all.

The teleological view of nature was deeply rooted in Plato's most central philosophical beliefs.¹⁰ This view was further confirmed by the discoveries in astronomy made during his lifetime by the Pythagoreans. The world is not a blind, chaotic compound of mechanical parts, a result of directionless necessity; it is a living, organic system, designed with purpose and revealing rational finality. If the earth is round and if the planets are revolving on circular paths, it is clear that the world is built on the most perfect patterns of movement, and that order and harmony constitute the basis of its structure. The world is governed by reason and order, and therefore it can be understood and explained properly only if it is accepted that it is built purposefully, teleologically. Rational purpose, therefore, becomes for Plato the basic principle of explaining the universe. This is the reason why Plato wrote the Timaeus. It is a dialogue extremely rich in content wherein a great amount of thought is compressed into a comparatively small space. This is why it is sometimes difficult to grasp the full implications of the text. The Timaeus is Plato's testimony to the Intelligence discoverable in the structure, life and order which pervades the cosmos. It is the earliest and the most impressive account of “creation” in Western thought besides the biblical story of Genesis.

The essential message of the dialogue is contained in the thesis that this universe can be explained only within the teleological perspective. Most commentators would agree with Cornford that this is the central message of the Timaeus: “The whole purpose of the Timaeus is to teach men to regard the universe as revealing the operation of such a Reason, not as the fortuitous outcome of blind and aimless bodily motions.¹¹

Paul Shorey concurs: “Plato undoubtedly intends seriously as the central thought that the universe somehow is a product and revelation of intelligent design and beneficent purpose.”¹²

The teleological view of the universe presented in the Timaeus has its natural and necessary place in the whole Platonic philosophical system. It is a required completion of his central philosophical views. That which deserves the name of “really real” is only that which is immaterial, eternal, imperishable, immortal. This is the world of ideas. The noblest and most real in man is not his body, but his soul, which is immaterial, immortal, and destined for an eternity of bliss. The highest level of the soul is intelligence, which is the only source of authentic knowledge in man. It opens man up to the vision of the ideal, and enables him to lead a virtuous life. The whole destiny of man depends on maintaining harmony and order within himself, and this is the essence of virtue. But harmony and order are possible only if man is governed by intelligence, reason.   The Republic–a theory of the ideal state–is based on the analogy between the order and harmony in the human soul and the order and harmony which should prevail in the state. In the Timaeus the soul is presented as a microcosm reflecting the macrocosm which is endowed with an order and harmony of its own. The heavens reveal the beauty and harmony governing the universe. Plato joins together the order and harmony of the human soul–the essence of the virtuous life–with the order and harmony of the universe. In this way he provides for human morality a cosmic base, ultimately linked to the ideal cosmos, since the whole visible, phenomenal world is only a fleeting and imperfect image of the world of ideas. I shall revert to this topic later.

The Timaeus raises a great number of very interesting and deep philosophical problems, the study of which would prove extremely rewarding. However, since the purpose of this study is restricted to a critical evaluatio

evaluation of the Platonic concept of final causality, the following questions emerge as important: (1) How does Plato conceive the relationship between intelligence and the structure of the world? (2) What is the philosophical validity of his thought in this respect? The above questions can both be answered through an analysis of the pertinent elements in the Timaeus with references, where necessary, to other dialogues.

The Plan of the Timaeus. The whole Timaeus can be divided into three parts, as suggested by the text itself, and this will help in giving a bird's‑eye view of the. dialogue. ¹³ The three parts are (a) Introductory Conversation (17A-27B), (b) The Prelude (27C-29D), (c) The Discourse (29D-69A). The latter in turn can be subdivided into three parts: (a) the works of Reason (29D-47E), (b) “what comes about of necessity” (47E-69A), (c) purpose and necessity–woven together in a more detailed description of man (69A to the end).

The Introductory Conversation which ends with the story of the mythical Atlantis is not very important for this study. The Prelude and The Discourse contain the essence of the dialogue.

The Prelude (27C-29D) contains an elucidation of the basic principles of the discourse to follow and the limitations of the phenomenal type of approach. These principles apply to anything that is not eternal but comes to be, and since the whole visible world is constantly in the process that is coming-to-be, they apply to the whole visible universe. The first principle: Only what is eternal and immutable is intelligible or capable of an accurate rational account¹⁴; whatever is visible is changing and all that is sensible is in the process of coming to be.¹⁵ Second principle, whatever is coming-to-be must have a cause: the universe comes-to-be therefore it must have a cause.¹⁶ This cause is the maker of the world.¹⁷ Third principle, the maker of the world will make a good universe only if he uses a model for his work, and not any model, but an eternal model. This world is good, therefore, it has an eternal model.¹⁸

This universe is the product of its maker, who fashioned it according to a model of that which is eternal and thus comprehensible by rational thought and discourse. Therefore:

Again, this being so, our world must necessarily be a likeness of something. Now in every matter it is of great moment to start at the right point in accordance with the nature of the subject concerning a likeness then, and its model we must make this distinction: an account is of the same order as the things which it sets forth–an account of that which is abiding and stable and discoverable by the aid of reason will itself be abiding and unchangeable; while an account of what is made in the image of the other, but is only a likeness, will itself be but likely, standing to accounts of the former kind a proportion: as reality is to Becoming so is truth to belief. If then, Socrates, in many respects concerning many things the–gods and the generation of the universe–we prove unable to render an account at all points entirely consistent with itself and exact, you must not be surprised. If we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other, we must be content, remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human and consequently it is fitting that we should in these matters accept the likely story and look for, nothing further.¹⁹

The stress on the distinction between Being and Becoming is crucial to the very essence of Platonism. It divides all existence into two radically distinct orders: (1) the unchanging, eternal, that which alone really is, the “really real,” and (2) the changing, flowing, passing, that which really never is, only always becomes and vanishes away, and “is never real.”²⁰ The first order, the real, and unchangeable, is the one that can be apprehended by thought. It constitutes the intelligible. Only of that realm is an authentic and strict, certain knowledge possible. The changeable is the object of sensation and can yield only belief. Sensation is un-reasoning. Thus, only in pure dialectics where strict definitions are possible is certitude present. The eternal and the unchanging (the world of Ideas, Forms) corresponds to the nature of the mind and constitutes its proper object. Cosmology, biology, physics, etc., which deal with the sensible, or physical in general, i.e., with what “never is, but always becomes,” give only belief, opinion and never certain knowledge. The account in Timaeus will thus be, in Plato's words, only a “likely story.”

This world is only a copy of an eternal model, ²¹ and consequently a likeness, and a fleeting likeness, of something other than itself. It follows that an account of „what is made in the image of that other, but is only a likeness, will itself be but likely.”²²

The conclusion of the whole analysis is stated at the end of the passage quoted above: “If we can furnish accounts no less likely than any other we must be content remembering that I who speak and you my judges are only human, and consequently it is fitting that we should in these matters accept the likely story and look for nothing further.”²³ Similar remarks of caution are given by Timaeus many times during the whole discourse.

What is meant here? Does it mean that Plato is not serious in proposing the philosophical doctrine of the Timaeus, whose central message is that this universe displays to the human mind a work of Reason acting with a purpose in view? This can hardly be the case.

Plato gives enough hints as to what he means. The “likeliness” of the story of Timaeus refers only to the details of the physical statements depending on sense data. Absolute certainty is not obtainable here. This, however, does not undermine the central philosophical content of the dialogue. The distinction between the different kinds of knowing is based on the Platonic premise of the radical division of all reality and the modes of knowing it. It might sometimes be difficult to raw a clear line of demarcation in the dialogue itself as to the text makes clear that in metaphysics, mathematics, dialectic we do have certain knowledge. The basic Platonic option for the knowledge of pure intellectual where myth is involved and where strict argument, but forms over and above the sensible and the visible is characteristic of the whole of Platonism, and it cannot in all fairness be taken as an objection against the message of the Timaeus. This world, according to Plato, is a copy of the eternal, and so it participates in the ideal. If the word “participates” has not been clearly explained even by Plato, it still remains true that the participation of this world in the eternal and ideal is a truth which Plato accepted very firmly. As a matter of fact, as we shall see, the Timaeus may be a partial attempt to answer the question of participation. The Demiurge, by fashioning the elements and introducing order into the world according to the principal ideas, makes it participate in the eternal: he makes it an “image of eternity.”

The second principle of the Prelude²⁴ is a metaphysical statement: whatever becomes, must become “by the agency of a cause.” This is a universal metaphysical principle, which Plato takes as evident. Ontology remains the ground of cosmology.

Two meanings of the word “becomes” as related to the visible universe must be carefully distinguished: (1) something comes into existence, either suddenly or at the end of a process; (2) something is in the process of change; in this sense the process can be eternal: without beginning or end, a perpetual process. Plato has in mind the second way of becoming: perpetual coming-to-be, “… that which is always becoming and is never real.” ²⁵ However, he also talks about time as having begun with the work of the Demiurge. How these two perspectives can be reconciled shall be discussed later.

The important point for us is the principle of causality mentioned above.²⁶ The cause, mentioned twice in the passage, is an active cause: an agent. This cause is interpreted in section 28 as “the maker and father of this universe…”²⁷ This “maker and father” is the builder of the world. The cause, therefore, means an Intelligence acting teleologically. The same idea is expressed in the Sophist,²⁸ where divine causation is defined as “a causation working with reason and art,” and proceeding from the divinity.

In the Philebus²⁹ the statement is made that cause is necessary for all things that become. The cause (aitia) is the same as the “maker” (to poioun). The cause of the universe is not random and disordered,³⁰ but directed by wisdom (phronesis) and intelligence (nous). Then the analogy is drawn from human soul to the soul of the universe; as in man it is intelligence which establishes order and harmony, so the same must be true of the universe. The order of the universe is caused by intelligence (nous).³¹ Now, since intelligence resides only in souls, Plato infers that there are cosmic souls, and that the world is governed by intelligence. Intelligence is the cause of cosmic order.³² Intelligence (nous) then is identical with cause or as one commentator says: “…the Nous belongs to the category of cause.”³³

A similar argument is also given in Laws, X where Plato attacks atheism and moral skepticism^, and cynicism by stressing that the disease of atheism is rooted in the false teachings of philosophers that this world is the product of unintelligent movements and purely material elements.³⁴

The argument here can be summarized in the statement that all motion of all bodies must ultimately be caused by motions of the soul: conscious design and purpose are at the origin of all process. The mind, not the body, is the origin of movement.³⁵ The reasoning is as follows: all motions can be reduced to two classes: (1) communicated motion or movement “from another”, and (2) spontaneous motion (that which moves itself),³⁶ and communicated motion comes always ultimately from spontaneous motion. Now, whatever exhibits spontaneous motion we call living (empsychon); we say that it has a soul. In other words, the word “soul” (psyche) is convertible with source of spontaneous motion. The conclusion is that all physical motion has its source in the movements of the soul. Therefore, the soul or mind is the cause of cosmic motion also. Plato does not believe in any spontaneous physical movement.³⁷ A similar line of thinking is found in Phaedo and Phaedrus arguing to the immortality of the soul. God, the orderer of the world, is called the “best soul” and although in this world disorder also exists, the “best soul” remains the supreme fashioning cause of the world.³⁸

In the first part of the Discourse Plato presents the works of Reason (29D-47E). The works of Reason are those elements in the world which display intelligent design.

The Demiurge fashions gradually the world's body and soul, the heavenly gods: the stars, the planets and the earth.³⁹ Later, these gods create mankind, and other living beings⁴⁰ Plato gives a description of the human body and the reasons for its structure, especially the structure of the human eye.⁴¹ He proposes the reason why man has vision and hearing: so that by observing order and harmony through the study of astronomy and music, he may be able to introduce order and harmony into the movement of his own sou1.⁴² The Forms remain always the models of the making of this visible reality. The Demiurge is the agent of ordering the world and what is found in it.

The second part of the Discourse (47E-69A) describes “what comes about of necessity.” By “necessity” is understood blind physical causation. This element of blind necessity is “persuaded” by the Demiurge, but only to a degree. A residue of the blind and the necessary always remains! Space, the matrix or receptacle, is described. The Demiurge orders its random and irregular movements by fashioning it according to geometrical principles.⁴³ Sensation is connected with the geometrical forms of he primary bodies. The different kinds of are related to the geometrical structure of the elements which are the constitutive material of bodies.

Part three of the Discourse (69A-End) describes the three main parts of the human soul and the structure of the most important organs of the human body and their functions. Finally, Plato describes different diseases of the soul and body, and the forms of the pathological states of each, giving different prescriptions for attaining order and harmony of the soul (the essence of virtue is harmony, effected by the mind in man) by controlling the lower parts of the soul and subduing the body under the direction of the soul. The bodily, physical elements are stressed as being of great importance. The evil states of the soul (immorality) are portrayed as conditioned and dependent on a faulty, disharmonious bodily basis: a disharmonious unhealthy body is responsible for a disharmonious, evil soul. In summary, a crippled body cripples the sou1.⁴⁴ The mutual influence of the corporeal on the spiritual, and vice versa, has been very well stressed at this point.⁴⁵ The body must be „persuaded” by the mind, although complete and perfect control here is a matter of aspiration only. It is an ideal always calling for more perfect realization.⁴⁶

After this sketchy outline of the Timaeus we come back to the original question: What is, for Plato, the ultimate ground of the purposeful formation of the universe?